ByJohn Paloubis
Vice Admiral (ret.) from the Hellenic Maritime Museum in Piraeus,Greece
No one who has not travelled professionally at sea can imagine whata tough occupation being a sailor is in peacetime. Dreary and cruel,it keeps you far from family and loved ones. Sea voyages demandhard work; they require mettle and courage. The work itself isphysically tiring and soul-destroying, as the seaman becomes a cogin a dull routine that seems to last for ever: hours, days and monthsseeing the same things, doing the same jobs, washing the samebulkheads, scraping the same metal plate.When not on duty, between the watch bells, you travel alongpaths in your mind, usually back home to your favourite haunts,places and people. The interminable loneliness proves harder to bear than the work, than the watch. You have the feeling that your lifeis slipping away as you make your way along the same corridors,bump into the same people, read the letter from your mother or wifefor the hundredth time, or monotonously listen on the Japanese
compact disc player to the latest CD sent to you, with its songs ofyearning and heartbreak from the home country.
On your watch you must endure howling winds, rough seas,typhoons, dangerous currents, thick fog, but also periods of calmwhich are just as tiring, especially when you are completely surroundedby shiny blue horizons that resemble silk sheets, and youreyes are hurting from the light – intense, vast and boundless. Not tomention the monotonous throb of the engine, sometimes deafeningand other times almost imperceptible because you are so used to it,but it is always there, inside you, like the beat of your heart; you canfeel it in your veins like your very breath.
And suddenly war comes, making you appreciate just howpleasantly monotonous and tranquil, relaxing and desirable routineactually is. For in war there is no routine. The unexpected, the
unforeseen is never far away. Death is omnipresent. It comes fromthe air in just a few moments, it comes from the surface in the formof enemy raiders, it comes from beneath the surface in the form oftorpedoes fired by unseen submarines, which head for the hulls ofvessels like steel arrows and tear them apart, opening them up fordeath to enter. And just as you are approaching some port and arethinking that the voyage is over, death comes in the form of treacherous,murderous mines, floating just below the surface or resting onthe bottom, in relatively shallow water, waiting patiently like ghouls,like metal monsters, instruments of death ready to explode and sinka ship with all hands.
In the hell that follows each hit, resembling scenes out of Dante’sInferno, those who pass from life to death in the few seconds that ittakes for the ship to sink may actually be the ‘lucky’ ones. For those‘lucky’ enough to find themselves floating on the surface, grimlyholding on to some plank, or even in a lifeboat or on a raft, soakedfrom head to foot in oil, must now contend with the freezing cold,the burning sun, sharks, enormous waves, hunger, thirst and beingin the intimate company of death for a long period, sometimes forweeks on end. And this is assuming they have survived the usualstrafing in a ‘performance’ put on for the benefit of the enemy crews.The 20th century was the bloodiest century in the history ofmankind, for it hosted two world wars, in both of which our countryparticipated.
It is an undisputed fact that countries at war need huge quantitiesof supplies of every type. The main categories are food suppliesfor the general population, raw materials, especially for the war
industry, and military supplies such as munitions, fuel, and spareparts; then there are long lists of hundreds of categories and thousandsof different materials, from railroad cars and engines of everykind and capacity, to accessories for the uniforms of those doing theactual fighting, appropriate for the different climates and seasons inwhich the war is being conducted.These massive quantities of materials and supplies are whatin the first place ensure the survival of the population in the rear –they maintain life, activity, industry, electricity supply in the cities, villages and provinces, thus keeping the people’s morale high and thecountry’s capacity to cope with the war effort at a satisfactory level.
In addition, the support staffs of the Armed Forces must managethe so-called Daily Supply Flow, which involves large concentrationsof supplies and war materials that are despatched on a daily basisto the front line. These supplies include the fuel that allows tanks tomove, aircraft to fly, ships to sail, artillery to fire, armies to fight andthe war to be pursued.In the second great war of the 20th century, this vital chain ofsupply could be effectively maintained only by sea transport. Aircommunications were entirely inadequate from the point of viewof transport capacity. Even today, after leaps and bounds in thedevelopment of air transport, a huge number of flights would berequired to equal the transportation capacity of just one ship, and ofcourse at an incomparably higher cost.
Thus, it was the merchant vessel that maintained this chain oflogistics and supply, ferrying supplies mainly to England but also toall the other theatres of war: to Africa, the Mediterranean, northern Europe, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, northern Russia etc. Moreover,it was the merchantman which took part in almost all largescaletransportation of military units from one front to another,or in the major landing operations in North Africa, Sicily, Anzio,southern France and Normandy. It was the merchantman thatsaved thousands of lives by evacuating trapped units, as at Dunkirkand from Crete, and it was the merchant ship which broke theblockades and brought supplies to besieged garrisons, as at Tobruk.By way of conclusion, one could reasonably maintain that it was themerchantman which, sailing thousands of miles across the oceansand seas of the world, supplied the war effort and implemented thestrategic troop movements and manoeuvres that had been plannedon the military maps.
However, it must be stressed that the Merchant Marine is not astate service and its everyday operations are not controlled by thestate. The fact is that while it does operate within the existing legalframework, it shows no uniformity of action, nor does it adhere tothe common operations doctrine of the military service.Thus the change of operation from peacetime to war at a
completely unexpected time, as well as the results of merchantmenmission have to be evaluated with different criteria.The peacetime professional seamen are changed into warriors of
a war machine and are exposed to the same dangers as the militaryprofessionals, but without having the means for, or the specialtraining for, self-defence. Within the special context of wartime
operation the participation and contribution of the MerchantMarine are unique, and have to be assessed according to their ownassessment criteria.
World War II was one of the bloodiest and toughest wars in world historyand lasted almost six years. It began in Central Europe and gradually spreadthroughout the world, drawing in the majority of the world’s nations. ‘Little’Greece failed, despite its desperate efforts, to stay out of war and was coercedinto taking part in October 1940 faced with the dilemma to voluntarily be
enslaved or to fight.The country fought, resisted, was occupied, managed to survive and atthe end of the war found itself on the winning side. It paid a very heavyprice in proportion to the extent of its input, but the reward at the end ofthe war was inversely proportional.
Much of the Greek contribution to the successful outcome of the Alliedeffort is attributed to the Greek Merchant Marine. It voluntarily sidedwith the Allies from the day the war was declared, despite its country notgetting involved until a year later. This contribution came with a greatmany sacrifices.The purpose of this paper is to highlight these sacrifices and make known
the enormous achievements of the Greek Merchant Marine for the benefit of the country, global freedom and democracy..
World War II began on 1 September 1939 and ended with Japan’s surrenderon 2 September 1945.In order to better examine the contribution and the sacrifices of the Greek
Merchant Marine in World War II we divide the time into four periods:
Period A: Greece neutral. 1 September 1939 until 28 October 1940;
Period B: Greece fighting. 28 October 1940 until 28 May 1941;
Period C: Greece occupied 28 May 1941 until the end of the war on 5
September 1945;
Period D: From the end of the war until the complete sweeping of the Greek
seas by mines, 5 September 1945 until 21 February 1954.
In September 1939 Greece had the ninth largest merchant marine in theworld. The flags listed were as follows:
• United Kingdom
• USA
• Japan
• Norway
• Germany
• Italy
• The Netherlands
• France
• Greece
Quantitatively, Greek shipping in September 1939 was presented as follows:
Under a Hellenic flag 583 ships total
506 freighters
55 passenger ships
1 ocean liner
21 various others
1,878,403 GRT
Greek ships deployed in China 22 43,992 GRT
Under foreign flag 124 454,318 GRT
Motor sailing boats 713 55,057 GRT
Each was greater than 30 GRT.
The 22 Greek freighters and barges employed exclusively in the seas of Chinahad been purchased gradually by Greek ship owners after the Sino-Japanesewar and sailed under the Greek flag, registered in various Greek ports.Ships under a foreign flag working for Greek interests used various flags,but the most common was that of Panama.The declaration of war found the Greek freighters dispersed over all theseas of the world transporting goods and services on behalf of shipperswith the ships heading for the various countries and ports of the world,including England.
The Greek ship owners knew long before the outbreak of World War IIthat they would side with the British in the event of war. Despite occasionaldifferences, their long-time association with the British shipping industry,as well as the hospitality they traditionally enjoyed when doing businessin London, the metropolis of world shipping, had resulted in the UK beingtheir second home.
The declaration of war in September 1939 marked Greek shipping’sinformal engagement, almost a year before Greece itself entered the war.This resulted in the loss of about 90 Greek steamers due to acts of war,during a period when the country was still neutral.
With the exception of 15 cargo ships chartered to the Swiss governmentbefore the outbreak of the War, the entire Greek merchant fleet fought andtransported goods alongside the Allied forces during the war.With the outbreak of World War II, the British authorities attemptedto charter a large number of Greek steamers. The offer was extremely lowand, despite the pressure exerted having the advantage of controlling theinsurance and bunker markets, was categorically rejected by the Greek side.In addition to the above, the Greek ambassador in London expressed his
strong objection to a proposal that also bore the risk of exposing the neutralstatus of Greece and consequently the chartering of almost half the Greekmerchant fleet was avoided at the time. Greek ships continued operating ina fast rising free market until April 1940 when a deal was eventually reachedwhere 150 vessels were chartered to the British over a period of six months.
The Germans were disturbed by the use of the Greek merchant ships forBritish transport during Greece’s formal neutrality, but only in August 1940did they express their first reactions. A characteristic example can be foundin one of the telegrams regarding the activity of the Greek Merchant Marinefrom the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop dated 24 August 1940
to the German Ambassador in Athens and sent to the Greek government:“The fact that the maximum of Greek Merchant Marine is still usedon behalf of England is perhaps the severest of our complaintsagainst Greece. We expect that Greece immediately lift any obligationof Greek seamen travelling to the United Kingdom and alsoprohibit any voyage of ships flying a Hellenic Flag to British ports.
The best excuse of such acts, are the statements of Germany andItaly about the naval blockade. If, however, the Greek Governmentadheres to its original aspect, this may lead to dangers much severerfor the general interests of Greece”
The Hellenic Merchant Marine paid a high price for its assistance to thecommon case of the Allies. Since the first day of the war the Greek freighters,although neutral, were torpedoed and bombed without hesitation.
Losses in period A4were, in brief, as follows:
Losses due to the war 73 ships (of which 47 by submarine attack)
Confiscated 17 ships
Total 90 ships
The Italian attack against Greece on 28 October 1940 marked the entry ofGreece into World War II. Greek cargo ships played a crucial role transportingabout 4/5 of supplies and troops, bravely fighting on the Albanianfront. At the same time, Greek merchant ships, in addition to the servicethey offered operating alongside the Allied forces, continued to serve thecountry’s supply requirements.With the outbreak of war, the Greek government took the followingmeasures to protect the Greek Merchant Marine and to serve the war effort.The London radio station broadcast the following order:“At the behest of the Hellenic Government to freighters located in thePacific those headed towards America should continue their voyage.
If they are sailing towards Asia they should change course andsail to a British or Dutch port or a port of the United States or onebelonging to these countries. As for Greek freighters located in the
Atlantic, if they are headed west they should continue their voyage,and if they are sailing eastward they must head to British ports.Greek ships should not sail into French ports or ports of the Frenchcolonies.”The boats that heard the broadcast complied with the Greek government.Unfortunately there were freighters that were seized on the first day of thewar because on the opening day of the war they were found in Italian portsor ports controlled by the French Vichy government, or were otherwisedetained by the Germans.
In order to find capacity and transfer the necessary supplies to Greecefrom abroad the Imperative Law 2609/1940 was adopted providing authorisationto the Greek ambassador in London to undertake, requisition andcharter Greek vessels using an advisory committee chaired by him.Through the Maritime Committee established in London, an agreementwas made with the responsible British Ministry for the collective charterof the Greek ocean-going merchant fleet until the end of the war. At thesame time the Anglo-Greek Allocation Subcommittee was established inorder to ensure that the risks to which the Greek ships were exposed weresimilar to those of English ones, that charters of ships and also the numberof these vessels would be left to the approval of the subcommittee.Free of the general charter, the following categories were allowed:
• The ships that were time chartered by the Swiss government. TheGreek government paid the fare to the ship-owners in poundswhereas it was paid in dollars. This left a profit to meet the costs ofthe war.
• Various other classes of ships were designated to also collect fareson behalf of the Greek Government to address the government’soperating costs.
Additionally, Law 2669/1940 provided authorisation to the Minister ofMerchant Marine to mobilise seafarers. Under this law a decree was issuedmobilising the seafarers serving on vessels over 500 GRT as well as theunemployed in foreign ports. All were considered conscripted and remainedin their positions, and those who abandoned them, or refused enlistmentwhen required by the authorities, were declared deserters in wartime andpunished under the provisions of the Military Criminal Code and theDisciplinary Code for Mariners.Following Italy’s defeat, Germany had no alternative but to occupyGreece with its own forces. On 6 April 1941, Germany invaded the countryfrom the Greek-Bulgarian border and, thanks to their powerful air force,managed to move further south.
On 3 May 1941 in view of the final collapse of Greece to advancing Axisforces and the determination of the Hellenic government to redeploy toEgypt, where it would continue the fight until the end, Law 3009/1941 wasissued according to which all ships, boats, and other floating craft underthe Hellenic flag, and every ship owner, operator and crew member, wereput under the control and jurisdiction of the lawful Hellenic governmentin exile. This law spared the Greek ships against possible hostile actions ofthe allies, who could otherwise find that ships were operating under thecommand of the occupying government installed in Greece.Among Germany’s first priorities following the occupation of Athenswas to secure the control of Greek cargo steamers still in service. The PrimeMinister of the government they installed delivered a letter to the Unionof Greek Ship Owners on 5 May 1941, requesting all its members to conveyto their ships the order that all vessels would be placed at the disposal ofGerman forces. However, a few days before the occupation of Athens, the ship owners’ legal advisor had taken the initiative to burn all relevant files
that could link the ownership of ships to individuals.
This action did not stop the Germans who were eager to control theGreek fleet. Employing another tactic, they offered to acquire Greek shipswith official memorandums of agreements, stating that under British controlthey were useless to the Greeks anyway. The offer was tempting as mostship owners would not have been able to support themselves with thefunds. However, when they realised that by doing this the Germans wouldbe able to demand delivery of all Greek ships calling in neutral ports, theypretended they were only managers and that the real owners were based
abroad. The Germans continued to press and threaten with imprisonmentin order to achieve their purpose, but failed to break the owners’ resolve.The conqueror’s plan to take control of the Greek merchant fleet was permanentlyshelved.
During the Italian and German invasion, the transfers made in the Hellenicmarine area and in the wider Eastern Mediterranean were particularlydense. The German phase was particularly devastating for Greek shippingand for most Greek passenger ships. The presence and effectiveness of theGerman air force was the sole cause of large losses. The Germans sent their
air force to destroy any watercraft by which British and Greek forces couldescape to Crete and Egypt.Following successive air strikes, almost 120 Greek vessels, including theentire passenger fleet and five hospital ships were hit and sunk in Greekwaters. Only four passenger vessels managed to survive escaping to theMiddle East.Nevertheless, many other ships were able to escape while simultaneouslyproviding valuable transportation for the benefit of the common Alliedstruggle. The contribution of merchant shipping during this phase was soimportant that the Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet, Sir AndrewCunningham in his day order on 11 May 1941 said:
“I wish to convey my satisfaction and my admiration for the workof the masters, the officers and crews of the Merchant Navy andallied merchant vessels which took part in the movement of the
Imperial forces to Greece and, in recent operations, when they werewithdrawn. During the period of these operations under conditionsof significant risk and difficulty, there was no hesitation in thedecisive way in which ships counterattacked air raids with thedefensive weapons. It was wonderful. We, the Royal Navy and menof the Imperial Forces, we understand the dimension of the abovementioned services and the debt owed to the Merchant Navy and itsdedicated work of the past weeks.”
In summary, the situation of lossin this period was:
sunk by submarine action 21
sunk by air action 126
sunk by mines 6
sunk by surface raiders 5
sunk by an unknown cause 7
Total 65
The divs above do not include losses of motor sailing ships which at theend of this period were particularly important. The Hellenic losses of thisperiod are in addition to the almost complete destruction of the flourishingHellenic River shipping in the Danube. The scale of this is not exactlyknown, but it is known that it had many river ships, barges and tugs withmany Greeks serving aboard. Following the accession of Romania to theAxis and occupation of Greece, those vessels were considered war bootyand were seized by the German authorities.The occupation of Crete was completed on 28 May 28 1941. After thatonly the decks of Greek naval and merchant ships were considered Hellenicterritory and so these formed the basis for the economic survival of the
Hellenic government in exile.Meanwhile, the remaining Greek ships were requisitioned by order ofthe official government of Greece. Formed under tragic circumstanceswith the support of the British when the German forces were approachingAthens, the government had eventually moved to Crete. Following therequisition order, all ships were placed under the control of the British
forces throughout the War, plus an additional six-month period after itsend, according to the Anglo-Hellenic Agreement signed by the government.
It must be stated that throughout the War, ship owners acted as managersof their own ships, appointed by the Greek Maritime Commission set upin London under the control of the Greek ambassador. Their income wasrestricted to a monthly hiring fee, equal for all ships and covering basicoperating costs, which were unfortunately constantly rising. This was dueto excessive demands by seafarers, whose requests were readily met by theGreek government, residing at that time in Cairo.During this period, commercial shipping and the people who servedit showed some positive and negative peculiarities. Merchant ships thatsurvived, those which fled and those which found a way to get away fromGreece, along with the remnants of the Armed Forces who were able toleave, formed the nucleus and the drive to continue the struggle against theoccupier. Ships and sailors were uprooted. Their home had been enslavedby a conqueror which, during the early years at least, undoubtedly seemeddominant in all fields of battle. Liberation and the chance to return homeseemed distant and unlikely.
The Greek ships sailed in all the seas of the globe, survived or werelost, with no one being aware of their fate. Seafarers may had been gone,but their families were in Greece and were hungry and suffering. The epicperformance of Greek shipping in the War was unfortunately marked byseveral incidents created among seafarers following the fall of Greece inApril 1941. This led many of them to the United Kingdom and especiallyto Cardiff where the Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation (ΠNO) first set upoffices, followed two years later by the communist-controlled Organisation
of Greek Seamen’s Union (OENO). The latter, with the support of local leftist unions and under the toleranceof the Greek government in Cairo, managed to take control of the situationon board many Greek ships and put forward its views to many seafarers whowere physically and mentally exhausted by the tragic conditions created bythe war. Ships were constantly torpedoed at the time, while their seafarerswere concerned about the fate of families and relatives back home sincethey were practically unable to arrange for money to be sent to them. At thesame time, the government in exile was not able to address these seriousissues. Many seafarers sunk into desperation and acted in a manner thatdisturbed order on ships, even reaching mutiny in a few cases.
Despite the fact that the entire Greek seafaring family demonstratedheroism and self-sacrifice throughout the War, such behaviour and excessivedemands on seafarers led to unpleasant results. By the end of World War II,ships under a Greek flag had lost their competitive status as their operatingexpenses were only less than those of the fleet flying the US flag. On theother hand, the state of harmonious co-operation between owners andseafarers that had served as the cornerstone for the evolution of Greekshipping, was seriously shaken. Both the flag and the crew were Greek the ships chartered to the Swissgovernment were excluded from this British charter. At the beginning therewere 13 of these ships, but as a result of British pressure there remained only
eight. Furthermore, another ten ships remained available to the Hellenicgovernment abroad, benefitting from the difference between free and timechartering to cover operating costs.
The charter to the British Government meant Greek vessels were nolonger free for transfers other than those determined by the British Ministryof Transport and, of course, time spent in port for repairs, or simply forthe crew to rest, was minimal. Greek freighters could be found travellingin these circumstances on seas across the globe.They sailed the dangerous central and northern Atlantic routes, servingas the vital transport of supplies for England from the U.S in the years1942–43. They took part in Russian supply convoys through the port ofMurmansk, where chances of surviving a shipwreck at sea dwindled afterjust a few minutes.
They could be found on the British Army supply routes in Egypt, circum –navigating Africa, crossing the South Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Theyparticipated in the supply of Australia, China, Burma and India. In all thesemissions, in addition to from the dangers of the sea, not themselves negligiblefor the old and fatigued freighters, they had to face the dangers of warmainly in the form of German, Italian and Japanese raids and submarines.Often, due to low speed or because of malfunctions, they remained behindconvoys. This caused the loss of a number of ships.
They served the needs of the Greek and British Navy providing supportwith ships that had escaped from the Germans during the taking of Greece,and those that managed to escape under the subsequent occupation. 300motor sailboats are estimated to have escaped from Greece during theoccupation, and to those can be added about 100 Greek-owned vesselswhich escaped from the Italian-occupied Dodecanese islands. These vesselsprovided a valuable service to free Greek Authorities using bases in Cyprus,Alexandria, Beirut and Smyrna. They were also used by the British forvarious missions in the Mediterranean and Aegean.
It is difficult to accurately pinpoint the losses of small motor sail boatsgiven the difficult periods of total confusion during the occupation. Theallied authorities had issued orders to cease communications between theislands and mainland Greece which was served almost exclusively withthese small vessels, because these communications reached the occupiedgarrisons of the islands. Therefore, most losses are due to Allied action. The missions of these vessels included:
• Providing support services to the Hellenic Navy;
• Aiding the escape of people and agents from occupied Greece;
• Commando operations;
• General transportation;
• Serving the communication needs of the islands during the first
months following liberation.
Losses of Greek ships in the period that followed the occupation of Greeceuntil the end of war can be summarised as follows:
• Ships sunk 8 182
• Motor sailboats sunk 9 483
• By Allied submarines 116
• By German submarines 1
• By Allied air force 166
• By German air force 78
• By mines 42
• By undetermined cause 80
The end of the war marked the beginning of a period of rebuilding in Europe.Trying to cope with the movement of people who had been displacedvoluntarily or involuntarily, as well as the transport of suppliesto feed the people and rebuild the cities and villages meant an enormousstrain on transport networks.The war, however, had left mines of all types scattered in the seas, laid
as part of the war for defensive or offensive purposes including magnetic,acoustic, percussive and anchored mines with the aim of prohibiting theenemy from crossing certain stretches of water. After the war the participantsgave the co-ordinates of the minefields. Even so, many minefields were notexactly known and many mines had been cut from their anchor, or haddrifted away and were a deadly threat to passing ships. Naval minesweepersimmediately began the arduous task of clearing the seas. This long processclaimed victims among both operating minesweepers and merchant ships. Even after the war 20 Greek merchant ships were lost to mines.
There were 583 Greek-flagged merchant vessels of all kinds in 1939 withan approximate total capacity of 1.8 million tonnes. At the end of the war in1945, 126 ships remained with a total capacity of about 0.5 million tonnes.In other words, 78 per cent of the ships were lost equating to 72 per centcapacity. Of the fleet of small motor sailing boats, 483 were lost, or 68 percent of their total number. The Greek Merchant Marine had 20,000 seafarers distributed aboardGreek-owned ships with a Greek or foreign flag, on foreign-owned vessels, andaboard many small sailing, fishing and motor boats. The latter were pushedhard on the Greek seas during the hostile occupation as they were the mainmeans of communication between the islands and the mainland country.
Existing evidence from different sources used to attempt to accuratelydetermine the number of the Greek sailors lost during World War II iscontradictory in many cases with regards to the actual divs and/ornames of those lost. The best and most conservative approach presents thefollowing categories of lost seamen:
Losses of Greek seamen on ships under Greek flag 1,547
Losses of Greek seamen on ships under foreign flag 152
Deceased abroad due to war-related causes 202
Deceased abroad due to unknown causes 27
Losses of Greek seamen on small motor boats 315
Losses of Greek seamen due to mines after the war 63
Total 2,306
Losses of non-Greek crew on ships under a Greek flag 431 (from 42 countries) and materials
While Greece was paying its own toll in blood in the Allied war effort,other countries enjoyed the guilty silence of neutrality, even collaboratingwith the Axis powers, as the collaboration served their own economicinterests.Nazi Germany during the war purchased:
• Manganese for the barrels of cannons and weapons from Spain.
• Tungsten for the aerospace industry from Portugal.
• Iron ore from Sweden.
• Oil from Romania.
• Diamonds for machines and tools for industry to support the war
from South America.
These raw materials were purchased through Swiss mediation. Switzerland,apart from their own high quality arms exports to the Third Reich, alsofacilitated international trade for the Germans.
Finally, there is the case of Turkey. Turkey attested its neutrality, butprovided Germany with massive exports of chrome ore, the raw materialrequired for bearings and casings of shells. It also sent Greeks arrestedby border guards while trying to escape to Turkey by boat, or even byswimming, intending to reach the free Middle East. These captives werereturned to Germany almost certainly to be executed at the hands of theNazis. Only towards the end of the war, and once the scales of victory hadtilted towards the Allies, did Turkey join the Allies, with the aim of restoring
its position in the world.
Greek society has never been officially informed about the enormous,unprecedented contribution of its Merchant Navy to the national effortto achieve the major aspirations that followed World War II in the midtwentiethcentury. It never learned about the disproportionately high – forthe size of the country – sacrifice in lives and resources, one that remainsunrecognised, and never properly appreciated at the table of winners.Immediately after the war, the expediencies of the major powers at thetime and the cold realism which prevailed in international relations took
the place of the hymns and praise for Greek contributions to the commonAllied cause, and all hopes of national integration through the liberationof enslaved areas of the nation once again remained unfulfilled.
This collective forgetfulness and ignorance may have been exacerbatedby the national tragedy of the bloody civil war that followed World War II.Then again, it may be that the dignity of our seamen prevented them fromactively seeking publicity and exploiting their contribution. The modestywhich characterised them meant they kept their sacrifice far from any suchvulgar display. A handful of their close relatives in maritime areas of thecountry have kept a few precious mementoes, along with several yellowing photographs, to remind the younger generations of their loved ones who lieat the bottom of the sea all over the world. Only they remember, togetherwith several elderly survivors, many of whom suffer from mental illness orsocial disorders, and unable to care for themselves, victims of the mentalcollapse caused by their shipwrecks, to become wrecks themselves.
A cement cross that looks out over the sea in a corner of the Peiraikipen- insula stands as the only sign of a faint national memory, a last bastionagainst total amnesia, in commemoration of those who: “have departed lifeforever, without a kiss, without a tear, without a companion, without burialgarments, in fact without a burial, far from their homeland and loved ones”.
Endnotes
1. Los 1998: 27.
2. Dounis 2003: 24.
3. Paizis 2004: 17.
4. Hellenic Merchant Marine Losses during World War II, 1991: 5.
5. Paizis 2004: 19.
6. Paizis 2004: 23.
7. Hellenic Merchant Marine Losses during World War II, 1991: 13.
8. Hellenic Merchant Marine Losses during World War II, 1991: 19.
9. Babouris 1949: 42.
10. Paizis 2004: 120.
11. Hellenic Merchant Marine Losses during World War II, 1991: preface.
12. Paizis 2004: 127.
13. Los 1998: 18.
14. Los 1998: 18
